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In April 2012, China’s Ministry of Civil Affairs completed the selection of377 projects from 901 applications submitted by officially recognisedsocial organisations across the country, and distributed 200 million yuan
of the central fiscal budget – the “special fund for social organisations’ par-
ticipation in service delivery” – to support these selected projects. (1) On 30
June, the Chengdu Social Organisation Development Fund was established
with a starting budget of 300 million yuan, the first of its kind in the country
fully supported and financed by a provincial capital city government. (2)
Starting from 1 July, the Guangdong provincial government relinquished the
old registration regulations and made it possible for social organisations to
obtain legal status without a “professional supervisory unit” (yewu zhuguan
danwei). (3) Despite the dramatic events of last year, including self-imposed
exile by a leading AIDS activist and the Guo Meimei incident, followed by
scandals within the China Charity Federation and warning signals from the
authorities due to the Arab Spring earlier this year, 2012 seems to be grad-
ually providing more fertile ground for grassroots social organisations and
the development of civil society.
As with Chinese politics in general, the issue of governing social organisa-
tions is filled with complex and sometimes contradictory trends. Thus, China
observers have arrived at different conclusions on the topic. Some praise “re-
markable” improvements in recent years regarding the regulatory framework
of social organisations, while many remain very cautious about the overall
policy environment for grassroots non-governmental organisations (NGOs),
social activism, and advocacy. (4) Instead of relying on reading the nuances in
policy documents, this research agrees with Guosheng Deng’s approach of
“in-depth exploration of the unwritten or unpublished rules” in examining
government-NGO relations, and engages the debate by examining the in-
teractions between governmental agencies and NGOs in daily practice. (5) To
do so, the authors during the period of January 2011 to May 2012 inter-
viewed 60 activists and staff from 17 provinces, who explained how they in-
teracted with a variety of governmental agencies ranging from professionally
relevant ones to those related to public security, foreign affairs, taxation, sta-
tistics, and state security. (6) In addition, the paper benefited from field re-
search trips to Guangxi in March 2011, Heilongjiang in August 2011,
Guangdong in March 2012, Sichuan in April 2012, Shanghai in May 2012,
and Gansu in July 2012, during which the authors met with leading activists,
civil affairs officers, and peer researchers in these provinces and discussed
changing the local policies and policy environment for NGO development. (7)
This research seeks patterns in the dynamic relationship between local
authorities and NGOs, and has found that, at the operational level, govern-
mental monitoring and control of grassroots NGOs remain pervasive and
effective to a large extent, in spite of recent promising changes in policies
at both the national and provincial levels. The enforcement of such control
is complicated by at least three layers of factors: First, the Chinese state
system is massive and often fragmented, and NGO control and regulation
therefore faces the common challenges of inter-bureaucratic and central-
local coordination. Second, since the NGO community at its origin is highly
diverse and continues to grow, NGOs’ responses to various kinds of govern-
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Graduated Control and Beyond
The Evolving Government-NGO Relations
FENGSHI  WU AND KIN-MAN CHAN
ABSTRACT: Despite recent policy changes, governmental monitoring and control of grassroots NGOs remain pervasive and effective to a large
extent in China. The enforcement of control over NGOs is complicated by at least three layers of factors: First, multiple agencies are involved in
NGO control without a centralised norm. Second, government-NGO interactions vary across cases and are deeply rooted in local political
contexts. Last, but not least, since the NGO community at its origin is highly diverse, NGOs’ responses to various types of governmental control
differ, which in turn triggers further complications. The main findings of this research are based on interviews with 60 NGO staff, as well as
with civil affairs officials in 17 provinces from January 2011 to May 2012.
KEYWORDS: state-society relations, NGO, Chinese politics, social regulation.
mental control measures differ, which in turn triggers further complications.
Last but not least, as voluntarism and establishing NGO are becoming wide-
spread social phenomena in China, the politics cantering NGOs is gradually
taking deeper root in local contexts.
This paper consists of four main parts. Part one reviews the evolution of
the regulatory framework of social organisations in contemporary China in
general over time and introduces the pattern of graduated control over
NGOs in particular. It also discusses various theoretical perspectives on the
topic. Part two further explores the differentiated interactions between gov-
ernmental agencies and NGOs, and outlines the main factors that shape
such interactions. Part three introduces the temporal dimension of the gov-
ernment-NGO relationship, and examines various NGO reactions to the
state’s graduated control. These responses trigger new adjustments in state
behaviour and the enforcement of the control policy. The last part calls at-
tention to policy innovations and changes in governmental attitudes to-
wards the issue of NGO development in several provinces and
municipalities, and argues that the overall control over NGOs is modified
by local political contexts.
A note of definition is in order. The paper defines NGOs as voluntary-
based, not-for-profit, and private organisations that exhibit a minimum level
of institutionalisation and self-governance. (8) In comparison, a “social or-
ganisation” is a much broader category, including but not limited to NGOs,
professional and business associations, hobby groups, and community-based
organisations. In the Chinese context, the definition of NGO is further mod-
ified by two specifications: Firstly, as current Chinese laws make it extremely
difficult to register as an NGO, most existing and functioning NGOs have
legal status as other types of legal entity. Therefore, the paper considers any
legally registered and/or publicly recognised organisation an NGO as long
as it in practice fulfils the requirement of being private, voluntary-based,
not-for-profit, and with a minimum level of institutionalisation and self-
governance. Secondly, the paper uses three criteria to differentiate NGOs
from quasi-governmental, semi-state-affiliated, or state-sponsored organ-
isations in practice. These criteria include: 1) the organisation is neither ini-
tiated nor registered by a concurrent governmental official or party cadre
as its sole legal representative; 2) the initial funding does not come from
the government or part of a governmental project; and 3) there is no
mandatory party organ within the organisation.
In the official policy language, three types of social organisations are eli-
gible and required to register with the civil affairs bureaus: 1) shehui tuanti
– membership-based associations; 2) minban feiqiye danwei – non-govern-
mental, non-profit organisations; and 3) jijin hui – charity foundations. The
first type is most highly restricted, as they are seen as the most effective
means of social mobilisation and therefore a threat to political authority.
Most of the NGOs analyzed here would fall into the second category if they
could obtain legal status. Some private charity foundations, such as the One
Foundation, Narada Foundation, and Vantone Foundation, find themselves
advocating for policy changes in a similar way to NGOs. However, the num-
ber, scope, and characteristics of these foundations are different from those
of grassroots NGOs, and thus they are not the focus of this paper. (9)
Social organisation regulation in China: A
brief review
Several benchmark studies point out that a nascent civil society emerged
in the late Qing period or even earlier. (10) Chambers of commerce, guilds,
kinship organisations, religious organisations, charity groups, and intellec-
tuals’ associations were not only active in their own arenas, but were also
involved in local governance and political activities. These groups continued
to engage in politics during the Republican period by organising events such
as protests and strikes around the May Fourth Movement of 1919 and the
May Thirtieth Massacre of 1925. Only after the Nationalist Party established
its government in Nanjing in 1927 and started to purge the Communists
was there a counter-trend in state-society relations in modern China
(Strand, 1989; White et al., 1996). When the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
took power in 1949, civil society was further suppressed, if not completely
eradicated. In 1950, Provisional Regulation for Registration of Social Organ-
isations (Shehui tuanti dengji zanxingfa) was promulgated, and by 1964 the
responsibility of overseeing these groups was assigned to “supervisory units”
(zhuguan danwei) such as state-owned enterprises and “people’s organisa-
tions” (renmin tuanti), e.g., the Communist Youth League, the All China
Women’s Federation, the All China Association of the Disabled, and the Na-
tional Federation of Industry and Commerce.
The Regulation on the Registration and Management of Social Organisa-
tions promulgated in 1989 after the Tiananmen crackdown was the first at-
tempt of re-organising state-society relations since the end of the Cultural
Revolution. Set against the background of the June Fourth movement and
the preceding decade of political liberalisation, it was meant to strengthen
the state’s control over the reviving civil society forces through regular
measures. This Regulation was amended in 1998 in the wake of the Falun
Gong protests that took the central political authority by complete surprise.
There have been high expectations of a new round of revisions to the Reg-
ulation since then, but none has appeared to date. As mentioned at the be-
ginning, Guangdong in 2012 became the first province to establish and put
in force a new set of rules regarding social organisation registration and reg-
ulation at the provincial level. Such could be interpreted as a signal for fur-
ther regulatory reform at the national level.
There are two defining characteristics of the 1989/1998 Regulation: ex-
clusion and dual supervision. (11) First, it stipulates that only one social or-
ganisation is allowed to register within an administrative sector at each
level. For example, if there is already in existence an environmental protec-
tion association registered at the Beijing municipal level, no other social or-
ganisation working in the same issue area for the entire city will be given
official approval. Simply put, with the existing government-established so-
cial organisations (also known as government organised NGOs – GONGOs)
in almost every sector and at every administrative level, there is little insti-
tutional space for any new, voluntary-based, and non-government initiated
organisations to obtain formal registration. This exclusive provision has
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largely curbed the growth of associations and any constructive competition
between civic associations.
In addition, the Regulation also stipulates the practice of dual supervision
to grant registration. Each organisation needs to find a state agency to be
its “professional supervisory unit” before applying for registration with the
civil affairs departments at different administrative levels. These supervisory
units assume not the professional/technical but the political responsibility
for inspecting the activities and finances of civic groups, making sure no il-
legal – or more importantly, no anti-governmental – activities take place.
Thus, governmental agencies have little incentive to sponsor civic organi-
sations, except when material interests or personal connections are in-
volved. (12) Under such arrangements, the state is accustomed to regulating
the development of social groups strictly in line with its main policy frame-
work. (13)
By the end of the 1990s, most scholars of state-society relations in
China viewed the exclusion of genuine citizen initiatives and dual super-
vision as exemplifying state corporatism – a system of interest represen-
tation in which a limited number of constituent units outside of the state
are recognised by the state, and therefore state agencies remain the mo-
nopolising representatives of respective sectors. (14) Entering the new mil-
lennium, the civil society sector has become unprecedentedly active in
tandem with deep socio-economic transformations throughout the coun-
try. Although the Chinese state recognises the need to create a new social
sector to cater to the needs of the population as the vertical rule of the
danwei system deteriorates, it still worries that this sector will turn into
a subversive force when given too much autonomy. This ambivalence has
created a lot of inconsistencies and even conflicts among state agencies
concerning matters related to NGOs. An increasing body of literature has
emerged and highlights NGOs’ autonomy and capacity to negotiate po-
litical space with the state. (15) Scholars have applied “fragmented author-
itarianism” to explain how NGOs, particularly those leading the anti-dam
construction movements, are able to utilise limited political opportunity
and form alliances with the media, experts, and reform-minded officials
to exert pressure on targeted large companies or specific state agencies. (16)
Moving to the side of the state, although inter-departmental conflict of
interest and central-local bargaining are salient features of the regime, many
have pointed out the Chinese state’s capacity for learning, adaptation, and
improving policy effectiveness. (17) In the field of social regulation, a policy
of “graduated control” (fenlei guanzhi 分类管治) has emerged and has been
implemented effectively. (18) Kang and Han argue that the Chinese authori-
ties differentiate social groups into various types and exercise different levels
of control accordingly. To some extent, a policy solution of remaining vague
at the overall level and striking deals in individual cases firmly reflects the
political pragmatism that has guided China’s miraculous economic reform
over the past 30 years.
Kang and Han’s framework covers a wide range of social organisations, in-
cluding GONGOs, NGOs, hobby groups, business associations, and informal
groups. We find this approach of interpreting policies and state intentions
N o . 2 0 1 2 / 3  •  c h i n a  p e r s p e c t i v e s 11
12. Fengshi Wu, “Environmental GONGO Autonomy: Unintended Consequences of State Strategies
in China,” Journal of the Good Society, vol. 12, no. 1, 2003, pp. 35-45.
13. Xiaoguang Kang, “Social Organisations in China’s Transitional Period,” in Zhongguo qingshaonian
fazhan jijinhui, jijinhui fazhan yanjiu weiyuanhui (China Youth Development Foundation and Re-
search Committee on the Development of Foundations) (ed.), Chu yu shi zi lu kou de Zhongguo
she tuan (China’s social organisations at the crossroads), Tianjin, Tianjin renmin chuban she, 2001,
pp. 3-29.
14. Jonathan Unger and Anita Chan, “Corporatism in China: A Developmental State in an East Asian
Context?,” in B. McCormick and J. Unger (eds.), China After Socialism: In the Footsteps of East Eu-
rope or East Asia?, Armonk (NY), M. E. Sharpe, 1996, pp. 95-129; Michael Frolic, “State-Led Civil
Society,” in T. Brook and M. Frolic (eds.), Civil Society in China, Armonk (NY), M.E. Sharpe, 1997;
Margaret Pearson, China’s New Business Elite, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1997.
15. Tony Saich, “Negotiating the State: The Development of Social Organizations in China,” The China
Quarterly, vol. 161, 2000, pp. 125-141; Jennifer Turner, “Small Government, Big and Green Society:
Emerging Partnership to Solve China’s Environmental Problems,” Harvard Asia Quarterly, vol. VIII,
no. 2, 2004; Kin-man Chan, “The Development of NGOs under a Post-Totalitarian Regime: The
Case of China,” in Robert Wellner (ed.), Civil Life, Globalization, and Political Change in Asia: Or-
ganizing Between Family and State, New York, Routledge, 2005, pp. 20-41; Kin-man Chan, “Chinese
NGOs Strive to Survive,” Social Transformations in Chinese Societies, vol. 1, 2005, pp. 131-159;
Jude Howell, “Civil Society in China: Chipping away at the edges,” Development, vol. 50, no. 3,
2007, pp. 17-23.
16. Andrew Mertha, China’s Water Warriors: Citizen Action and Policy Change, Ithaca (NY), Cornell
University Press, 2008; Kin-man Chan and Yan Zhou, “Political Opportunity and the Anti-dam Con-
struction Movement in China,” in Zhidong Hao and Sheying Chen (eds.), Social Issues in China:
Gender, Ethnicity, Labour, and the Environment, New York, Springer, forthcoming.
17. Dali Yang, Remaking the Chinese Leviathan, Stanford (CA), Stanford University Press, 2004; Kellee S.
Tsai, Capitalism without Democracy: The Private Sector in Contemporary China, Ithaca (NY), Cor-
nell University Press, 2007; Kun-Chin Lin, “Politics and the Market in Twenty-First-Century China:
Strategies of Authoritarian Management of State-Society Relations,” Political Studies Review,
vol. 10, no. 1, 2012, pp. 73-84.
18. Xiaoguang Kang and Han Heng, “Graduated Controls: The State-Society Relationship in Contem-
porary China,” Modern China, vol. 34, no. 1, 2008, pp. 36-55.
Fengshi Wu and Kin-man Chan – Graduated Control and Beyond: The Evolving Government-NGO Relations
Table 1 – Graduated Control of NGO
Business nature Main funding source Scale Level of Control
Small NGO based 
in residential community 
Low
Medium to large NGO, 
across communities
Medium
Domestic enterprises, 
domestic private foundations
Low to Medium
Foreign source of funding Medium to High
Category III:Advocacy in 
political/religious/ethnic
and/or other sensitive areas
Private donations, 
international NGO 
and foundations
NGO, informal groups, 
and/or network
High
* Note: Based and developed upon the model in Kin-man Chan, “Commentary on Hsu: Graduated Control and NGO Responses – Civil Society as Institutional Logic,” 
Journal of Civil Society, vol. 6, no. 3, 2010, pp. 301-306.
Category I: Service delivery
Category II: Service, 
public outreach, and advocacy
in non-sensitive areas
NGO and/or 
cross-regional network
Government, GONGO, 
official foundations
useful and accurate for understanding government-NGO relations in par-
ticular. It echoes the theme of “embedded activism” proposed by Ho and
Edmonds, which captures the tense and interactive relationship between
local governmental agencies, contextual factors, and NGOs. (19) Recent em-
pirical research further confirms the argument that NGOs and local author-
ities interact and negotiate on an almost daily basis. (20) As the NGO sector
has grown, the state’s learning of it has been enhanced. Although macro-
level policies remain vague and out of date, the actual enforcement of NGO
control on the ground has become more diversified and thus responsive to
the particulars of local conditions and the targeted NGOs.
Based on direct communication and interviews with grassroots NGOs,
this paper finds a pattern of graduated and targeted control over NGOs at
the operational level in China. Table 1 demonstrates the perceived risk of
NGOs and the parallel level of control exercised by the state. Three major
factors determine the level of governmental control and monitoring: busi-
ness nature, funding source, and scale. Business nature stands out as the
most significant factor, because it also to a great extent determines the
NGO’s funding sources and organisational scale. The Chinese government
allows, and increasingly supports, NGOs that provide services in issue areas
such as poverty reduction, elderly care, women’s and children’s programmes,
and basic education. Most such Category I NGOs have received and are in-
creasingly eligible to apply for funding from governmental agencies (e.g.,
civil affairs bureaus), GONGOs (e.g., official associations for the disabled),
and official charities (e.g., Red Cross China). Once fully funded with official
money, such NGOs are often considered a service arm of the administration.
In terms of scale, small NGOs working at the community level, particularly
the urban residential compounds (xiaoqu), are seen as the least threatening
to the regime. If they provide valuable social services, then some local gov-
ernments, such as those in Shenzhen and Shanghai, have even begun to
simplify the registration requirements. The Chinese state still finds large
NGOs that operate at the municipal or provincial level and serve popula-
tions across regions difficult yet necessary to control, even if they only aim
at providing services within the boundaries of governmental policies. In the
same vein, existing laws forbid NGOs with a nationwide membership base
and cross-regional NGO alliances.
The government exercises close surveillance, delays registration applica-
tion, and even impedes the development of Category II NGOs that serve
marginal groups such as migrant workers, peasants living with AIDS, or the
urban poor affected by forced house-dismantlement or industrial pollution.
This group of NGOs serves targeted populations not only by direct delivery
of care and service, but also by public education on the issues and even pol-
icy advocacy. The goal of their work requires them to bring in outside tech-
nical support, experts, and professionals, such as social workers, medical
professionals, lawyers, media, and public campaigners. Most of them are
therefore not bound to one community or a specific group of victims, and
they attract more attention from the supervising authorities compared with
Category I NGOs. Among Category II NGOs, those who are able to solicit
donations from domestic private enterprises or charities incur relatively
lower government monitoring. More vigorous government surveillance is
exercised over NGOs that receive funding from overseas foundations or
governments. Since March 2010, Chinese NGOs have been required to go
through a notarisation process for any projects funded by overseas enti-
ties. (21) Close to one-third of the 60 NGO staff interviewed for our research
reported that their funding had been frozen or significantly cut due to this
policy change.
Finally, the government ruthlessly cracks down on Category III NGOs and
networks that are perceived as involved in the democratic movement, reli-
gious mobilisation, ethnic separatism, human rights, or anything that is seen
as damaging China’s international image and internal regime legitimacy,
such as the Beijing Gongmeng Legal Research Centre and other rights ad-
vocacy groups. (22) Such organisations are usually not able to establish and
maintain formal organisational structures, and they most often obtain fund-
ing from overseas sources.
In practice, the above three factors together affect how the Chinese gov-
ernment views and monitors an effective NGO. For example, a fast-growing
NGO specialising in legal assistance for discrimination victims should be
regarded as having high risk given the fact that it conducts rights advocacy,
receives funds from foreign foundations, and has established affiliated teams
in multiple cities. (23) NGOs such as the Beijing Senior Citizen Cooperative
should be regarded as low risk, as they work in the area of elderly services,
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Table 2 – Content and relevant agencies of NGO control
Level of control Sectoral supervisor and 
civil affairs bureau Public security
Statistics, taxation, and
other regulatory agencies State security
Low
Minimum document-based
supervision, irregular 
meetings
Rare interaction No interaction No interaction
Medium
Frequent document-based 
supervision and meetings
Irregular personal
meetings, or
harassment
Warning, irregular
requests or visits
Irregular interaction
High
Scrutiny, official warning,
temporary closing down
Personal harassment, 
or office raid
Frequent request Frequent interaction
Type of control
receive funds from the Beijing authorities and domestic corporate charity
foundations such as the Guangdong Harmonious Community Foundation,
and limit their work strictly to the residential community level.
Graduated control in operation: 
Multiple dimensions and agencies
The framework of graduated control provides a theoretic overview of gov-
ernmental attitudes and behaviour towards NGO development in China.
This section substantiates this framework by providing the content of the
three levels of NGO control and explicates the various state actors involved
in the process.
The enforcement processes of NGO control in reality are complex and
operated by multiple governmental agencies without a centralised regula-
tory agency. Relevant governmental agencies treat targeted NGOs differ-
ently according to their own discretion. The two supervisory agencies, i.e.,
the professional/sectoral supervisor and the corresponding civil affairs bu-
reau, are in immediate contact with the NGOs. In addition, at least three
more categories of state actors are involved in monitoring NGO activities:
public security agencies at the local level, local or national-level statistics,
taxation, and other regulatory agencies, and last but not least, the state se-
curity agency.
Table 2 illustrates the detailed content of graduated state control over
NGOs. When such control and regulation remain at low levels, the NGO
submits progress reports, balance sheets, and other important organisational
files to its sectoral supervising governmental agency and the civil affairs of-
fice upon request or on an infrequent basis, e.g., annually or bi-annually.
Meanwhile, the NGO is seldom contacted by the district police station
(paichusuo) or other relevant public security agencies. Even when contacted,
such interaction is understood as part of regular checks by local public se-
curity agencies, for example, household registry and apartment leasing. No
state agencies beyond the administrative level of the NGO’s registration
will ever interfere with its activities or request to meet its leaders.
When an NGO is listed under medium-level monitoring and control, both
the professional and civil affairs supervisory offices will start contacting
NGO staff much more frequently. Reports and meetings are requested every
quarter or more regularly. At this stage, NGO staff, particular the founder(s)
and the executive director(s), may experience personal warnings or harass-
ment in written or verbal form by the local public security agencies. The
NGO will receive requests to submit finances, legal documents, and organ-
isational files to governmental agencies at higher level(s) of administration.
Recent cases from the field have shown that the State Bureau of Statistics
has become a common player in monitoring those NGOs that have con-
ducted cross-regional surveys or assisted foreign institutions’ research in
China. NGO practitioners may be “invited” for tea or meals by state security
agents (referred by activists as qing he cha). The actual content of these tea
sessions or meals can be ambiguous, but the indication is clear: The state
knows what the NGO is doing.
The high level of control means document-based checks by sectoral su-
pervisory agencies and the civil affairs bureau come by the month, week,
or even more often. It is not uncommon at this stage for NGO staff to be
asked to explain in detail their funding source(s), what kinds of foreign ex-
perts they are inviting, and what exactly they plan to do during a project.
Official warnings may be sent in the form of a “red-letterhead file” (hongtou
wenjian) charging the NGO with collaborating with foreign organisations
to disturb social harmony. The worst scenario is that the supervisory agency
will deny the necessary documents for renewing the NGO’s legal status,
which leads to temporary closure. The NGO and its staff may suffer in-
creased pressure including but not limited to office raids by local police,
charges of committing economic crimes or conducting illegal research, and
temporary detention. Most NGOs will not continue to resist, and will close
down at this point.
The above three levels are in a sense “ideal types” of NGO control. In prac-
tice, there is no definite institutional mechanism to coordinate various state
agencies when monitoring and dealing with one particular NGO. At each
stage, the NGOs do not necessarily undergo all types of interference by all
relevant governmental agencies. Especially during the medium stage, which
can last for a long while, different NGOs may experience very different in-
teractions with state agencies. Some can experience consistent document-
based redress without being visited by either public security or state security
officers. Some can receive serious requests from the state statistics and se-
curity agencies without any previous warning from the sectoral supervisors.
NGO responses and dynamic 
government-NGO relations
Not all NGOs suffer the same level of surveillance, nor does a single NGO
experience unvarying attention from the government over time. While most
service provision NGOs tend not to draw excessive interference from the
state, and any NGOs that touch upon sensitive matters will immediately
undergo a level of monitoring, for those NGOs situated in between (Cate-
gory II in Table 1) the level of surveillance can fluctuate noticeably. As these
Category II NGOs grow and expand their work, the initial level of govern-
mental control may evolve and escalate. Table 3 introduces the temporal
dimension of government-NGO interactions, and there follows an expla-
nation of the various NGO responses to government control and how such
responses further shape their relations with governmental agencies.
The meaning of “temporal dimension” is that relevant state agencies mod-
ify the level of interference over time, with all other factors remaining con-
stant. This pattern is particularly true with regard to Category II NGOs that
conduct both service delivery and some level of policy advocacy on non-
sensitive topics. Because they are usually working in fields that do not gen-
erally cause offence and pose little apparent conflict with the CCP ruling
ideology, e.g., gender equality in basic education, transportation and travel
access for the disabled, and eliminating discrimination against Hepatitis B
patients in job applications, they are mostly given enough space to develop
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Table 3 – The temporal dimension of the graduated 
control of category II NGO
Level of control Organizational development
Low
Early stage, limited visibility and outreach, 
1-2 years
Medium
Sustainable development and 
continual growth, 3-8 years
High
Relatively higher level of capacity, playing 
a leadership role among local NGO
their work for an initial period of time. During this relatively stable period
of growth, this group of NGOs can experience varying kinds of interactions
with different governmental agencies. It is important to introduce the tem-
poral dimension and to understand the dynamic nature of the government-
NGO power struggle.
The first one to two years for most Category II NGOs are free of stress.
The pattern that the NGOs follow all the rules and regulations and their
interactions with the government remain rare at this stage is by and large
consistent across cases. However, as soon as they survive the most diffi-
cult initial period when resources are scarce, public recognition is low, and
social networks are non-existent, they incur attention from various gov-
ernmental agencies at the same time as they launch major projects and
can almost see a bright future for their organisation and targeted popu-
lation/community. This period of medium-level control and monitoring
can last for five or even more years. Different NGOs interact, negotiate,
and resist governmental pressure in different ways, depending on their
leadership, organisational culture, and many other, unpredictable factors.
In turn, governmental agencies may back off temporarily, or intensify the
pressure. The outcome is not always constant. Once under high pressure
and intense monitoring by the state, very few NGOs, as pointed out pre-
viously, can and/or will resist for long, and the pattern becomes clear
again. Table 4 below highlights the general patterns of NGO responses to
state control and the outcomes of their negotiation and resistance. To
better explain the middle period, two recent field examples are given fol-
lowing the table.
Case A is an environmental protection NGO with a strong background
in student activism based in the capital city of a coastal province. (24) The
founding members started environmental activism when they were all in
university at the end of the 1990s. They turned the student green group
into an independent entity in 2001 with a small grant of US$400 from an
overseas foundation. Since 2004, the group has been commissioned by a
bilateral assistance agency to take charge of a seed-fund for student envi-
ronmental activism, first in the greater Yangtze Delta region, and later ex-
panded to cover the entire country. Its annual budget increased
significantly after 2007 and annual expenditure reached 170,000 RMB by
2012. The NGO has now four full-time staff (all in their twenties) and a
Board of Directors consisting of the founding members, who are now
recognised as “veteran” activists within environmental circles, and are well-
respected local environmental experts. Up to the present, the organisation
has not obtained legal status as a social organisation from the local civil
affairs bureau. Nevertheless, it has established its reputation nationwide
among the most active environmental NGOs and university-based green
groups.
Partially due to the fact that much of this NGO’s work focuses on public
environmental awareness-raising among youth, in spite of its foreign fund-
ing sources and lack of legal status, the government did not interfere with
its organisational autonomy. However, the situation changed in the spring
of 2011. After the municipal government announced a plan to uproot more
than 600 street trees to make way for the construction of subway stations,
NGO A utilised Internet-based mobilisation tools to call upon all residents
of the city to protect these trees. Most of the street trees in the city are
over a century old, and collectively they give the city a unique urban land-
scape. Soon after that, the local public security agency started to contact
the NGO’s executive director. Police officers called late at night and ordered
the director to report to the district’s police station. The director resisted
this order and protested via micro-blog (weibo), explaining the whole inci-
dent and putting forward three main points:
1) What our organisation and I myself endeavour to accomplish is in the
interests of all the people of our city. We have nothing to hide or be
ashamed of;
2) We welcome everyone to check our documents when the time, place,
and method are agreeable;
3) I do not feel safe walking late at night, and I hope the local police can
respect my basic rights; if so, I am more than willing to cooperate.
The micro-blog got hundreds of hits and the word was out immediately.
The local police sent someone to NGO A’s office the next day and apolo-
gised to the director. When interviewed in May 2012, the director expressed
mixed emotions of fear and courage on that night and informed us that the
level of interference from the public security sector had been stable and
had not intensified since that incident.
Case B focuses on rural development and works with a few villages in an
inland province with a relatively low level of economic development. (25)
From the very beginning in the early 2000s, this NGO was established as
an independent entity with a team of full-time staff and consistent foreign
funding. By 2006, it had not only successfully registered as a non-govern-
ment, non-profit organisation (minban fei qiye) with the municipal-level
civil affairs bureau, but had also secured a good working relationship with
its professional/sectoral supervisor. In 2007, the municipal Youth League
recognised and awarded its accomplishments. In recent years, this NGO has
also received a number of important awards within the civil society sector,
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Table 4 – NGO responses to governmental control (esp. Category II NGOs)
Level of control NGO responses Cases Outcomes
Low Follow the rules Remain low-level
Medium
Follow the rules, negotiate, 
resist occasionally
A
B
Remain medium-level
Escalate to high level
High Resist until give in NGO closed down
funded by major domestic donors and selected experts. It has become a
leading group among all NGOs in its own province and neighbouring re-
gions.
However, in the summer of 2011, its professional supervisory agency is-
sued an official warning accusing the executive director of NGO B of “col-
laborating with foreign, anti-government forces” and “refusing to comply
with relevant regulations.” The warning prescribed a two-month deadline
for the NGO, meaning that if it was not able to find a new supervisory
agency its legal status would not be renewed. Given the circumstances and
its record, it was impossible for the NGO to convince any other state agency
to be its supervisory affiliation.
The executive director of NGO B explained that before the official warn-
ing, their supervisory agency pestered the NGO’s staff with frequent re-
quests for information on their funding, external relations, and biographical
data of their advisors. Such requests started coming weekly or even daily,
disrupting the NGO to the extent that office staff could no longer manage
their regular work. In addition, staff members and volunteers felt high pres-
sure at the individual level. Facing increasing pressure, the NGO mobilised
all possible social capital and personal networks to find a way of commu-
nicating with supervisory agencies, in hopes of persuading them of the
NGO’s “political correctness.” Eventually, this NGO discontinued its efforts
and temporarily shut down its operations. (26)
Comparing the above two cases, both were under medium-level monitor-
ing by the state when the dramatic events took place, but Case A’s response
and online protest led to a relatively positive result, while Case B failed to
improve the situation. This paper is unable to explore systematically the
possible causes and mechanisms for the state’s counter-responses to an
NGO’s resistance to control and domination. However, a potential trend
indicated by the above two cases is noted. Case A’s open and confronta-
tional micro-blog, instead of annoying the local authorities, resulted in apol-
ogy and a subsequent smooth relationship. In sharp contrast, the NGO
director of Case B tried more conventional, culturally sensitive methods of
persuasion, but its attempts to “save face” for the government seemed to
have little effect in alleviating the pressure. The state’s decision to prioritise
“social stability” in recent years may have played a role in determining spe-
cific treatment of various NGOs and incidents.
It is important to clarify that the state’s interaction and interference with
NGOs are inconsistent, if not oscillating, over time. In most cases, as the
NGO grows, the level of state monitoring rises. During the stage of medium-
level control, the power struggle between NGOs and governmental agencies
reaches its peak. NGOs bear all the pressure and are able to mobilise their
social support to resist to some extent. It is during this period that different
NGO strategies and methods of resistance can lead to different outcomes
in maintaining or escalating the intensive situation.
Cooperation paralleling control: 
Local variations
Besides exercising control, a few local Chinese authorities began to take
proactive steps to encourage the development of social organisations within
the parameters set by the central government in the early 2000s. The 2008
Sichuan earthquake marked a new era in civil society development in China.
Since then, volunteerism, Internet-based charity activity, NGO establish-
ment, and citizen participation in disaster relief and other areas have flour-
ished across the country. (27) Facing soaring activism under the name of “all
people’s philanthropy” (quanmin gongyi), the state recognised the urgent
need to reform the regulatory system of civil affairs and social organisa-
tions. (28) Municipalities such as Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Guangzhou, and
Chengdu were among the first to experiment with programmes of “inno-
vation in social administration” (shehui guanli chuangxin). This policy con-
cept was gradually confirmed by the central government and explicitly
stated in a speech by President Hu Jintao in February 2011, setting the di-
rection of social development at the national level as strengthening “party
leadership, government responsibility, society’s cooperation, and public par-
ticipation.” As pointed out by Ming Wang, Director of the NGO Research
Institute at Tsinghua University, local governments have interpreted this “di-
rection” in different ways by putting emphasis on either one or more of the
four components. For example, Shenzhen has proposed “strengthening com-
munity building and innovating social administration,” downplaying the idea
of social control. Beijing and Chongqing, however, stressed “social adminis-
tration and conflict resolution.” (29) As “all politics is local,” daily enforcement
of the control policy is highly diverse across regions and deeply embedded
in specific policy context. This section uses representative evidence from
Sichuan and Gansu to illustrate how provincial governments vary in imple-
menting NGO control, and how recent local experimentation with the con-
cept of “innovation in social administration” could modify the contentious
side of government-NGO relations to varying degrees.
The post-earthquake relief and reconstruction opened a rare window of
opportunity for NGO and civil society development in Sichuan Province
and beyond in 2008. Despite the authorities’ change of attitude and shutting
out of non-local volunteers or NGOs within six months, local Sichuan
NGOs, especially those with some level of organisational capacity prior to
the earthquake such as Chengdu Urban Rivers Research Group (Chengdu
chengshi heliu yanjiuhui) and Roots and Shoots Chengdu (Gen yu ya), ben-
efited from the relatively friendly policy environment. (30) The ad hoc NGO
platform for relief and reconstruction – the “5.12 Non-Governmental Relief
Service Centre,” established by a group of 30 grassroots NGOs (based in
both Sichuan and beyond) on 13 May 2008 – has not only sustained its op-
eration to date, but also obtained formal registration with the provincial
government in early 2012. It has successfully transformed itself from a
loosely connected action network to an institutionalised NGO specialising
in natural disaster relief, reconstruction, and policy advocacy. Its current
leaders, including a senior researcher of the Sichuan Provincial Academy of
Social Sciences, Guo Hong, were invited to participate in policy consulta-
tions and were instrumental in drafting the new policies regarding NGO
management and “innovation in social administration.” (31) At the operational
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30. Interview with the director of Roots and Shoots Chengdu in Sichuan, 28 April 2012.
31. Interview with Guo Hong in Chengdu, 28 April 2012.
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level, NGOs strive to resist local governments’ interference to maintain their
organisational autonomy, reach those in need, and deliver care and service
on a daily basis. In general, however, Sichuan NGOs acknowledge their
space, yet limited, to work for the victims of the 2008 earthquake. (32) Fol-
lowing this trend, the establishment of the Chengdu Social Organisation
Development Fund to incubate more grassroots NGOs is explainable.
In contrast, many local NGOs have found the policy environment become
more obstructive in Gansu Province in recent years. By 2008, a dozen grass-
roots NGOs were active in areas such as environmental protection, ethnic
culture preservation, rural poverty relief, children’s mental health, and rights
for the disabled. Social gatherings, networking, and peer advising were com-
mon, and these NGOs enjoyed a sense of mutual trust and solidarity. How-
ever, in 2011, half of the NGOs went through vigilant checks and
interference from various governmental agencies. By the end of the year,
two NGOs decided to temporarily close down their work, and two others
had not yet completed renewal of their registration. (33) Although Gansu’s
provincial Bureau of Civil Affairs has started to experiment with new meth-
ods of engaging grassroots NGOs, other sectors of the provincial govern-
ment remain highly conservative and lack sufficient knowledge of these
organisations. Receiving funds from overseas organisations and donors is
still viewed by many governmental agencies as a sensitive issue. (34)
Sichuan and Gansu to some degree represent the two ends of the spec-
trum with regard to government-NGO relations in China at the provincial
level. Even with President Hu’s speech in February 2011, local implementa-
tions of the policy direction “innovation in social administration” vary in
pace and characteristics. Provinces such as Guangxi and Heilongjiang exhibit
characteristics similar to Gansu, where NGOs face persistent political ob-
stacles to enhancing their work quality. Governments in Guangdong and
Shanghai, like those in Sichuan, have launched a consistent effort to
strengthen the role of civil affairs bureaus in leading the reform of regulating
social organisations. (35)
In provinces where the governments and political leaders have made po-
litical commitments to reforming the sector of social administration, there
have been heated debates among officials and practitioners on how to im-
prove the policy environment for NGOs. Many innovative policy ideas are
being experimented with in different ways at the local levels, and thus may
lead to varying results. One example is the task to establish linkage between
governments and NGOs through intermediate organisations, and to develop
the NGO sector through a government-recognised incubation agency. In
Beijing, a new system of monitoring/supporting social groups through in-
termediate organisations was established under the framework of “cate-
gorised administration” (fenlei guanli). Similar to the practice legislated in
the 1964 Provisional Regulation for Registration of Social Organisations, dif-
ferent GONGOs were assigned as umbrella intermediate organisations in
specific issue areas to coordinate all existing and potential social organisa-
tions including NGOs. The Association for Science and Technology would
be responsible for groups related to technology innovation or public scien-
tific education, the Women’s Federation for all groups related to women’s
issues, and the Youth League for any youth-related groups. In Shanghai, the
municipal government established Service Centres for Social Organisations
at different levels to serve an intermediate role in 2005. However, Ma Yili,
current head of the Shanghai Bureau of Civil Affairs, pointed out that these
intermediate organisations would just create another layer of authority and
make the existing social administration system even more complicated. She
has stated that what China really needs is more support organisations to
help build the capacity of NGOs, (36) and she has expressed appreciation and
support for the Non-profit Incubator (NPI) founded independently by social
entrepreneur Lu Chao without any governmental affiliation in the mid-
2000s. NPI provides various services for social organisations, including train-
ing (developing a mission statement, personnel, and financial management),
coaching (in fund applications), and official space for new organisations to
kick-start their work. 
Later, NPI was invited by local governments in Shenzhen and Beijing to
replicate what was achieved in Shanghai. With the state retaining firm fi-
nancial and political liaison from the beginning, NPI’s autonomy is being
highly questioned by the NGO and activist community in Shenzhen and
Beijing. They argue that the NGOs incubated and supported by NPI are
mostly service delivery groups, merely meeting the needs of the government
without having an agenda of their own. In the context of rapid urbanisation
and residential community development in these mega cities, NGO leaders
expect that many more quasi-NGOs will be created by incubation agencies
similar to NPI to fill gaps in welfare provision. In Chengdu, many leading
grassroots NGOs remain cautious about the actual impact of the recently
established Social Organisation Development Fund.
Enhancing public participation is another policy idea raised in recent policy
documentation at the national level. Liu Runhua, former head of the Shen-
zhen Bureau of Civil Affairs and current standing deputy director of the
Guangdong Social Work Committee, expressed in a conversation with one
of the authors of this paper in May 2012 that his idea concerned not only
social service reform but also public participation when he was involved in
drafting the new policies related to “innovation in social administration.” In
his vision, the Provisional Method of Public Procurement of Services from
Social Organisations discussed above would encourage governmental agen-
cies to purchase services from social organisations to facilitate the delivery
of its essential functions beyond basic services delivery, including specialised
services such as legal assistance, policy (legislation) research, policy drafting,
organising hearings, and deliberation on policy initiatives. (37) His views are
undoubtedly among the most progressive within the Chinese state on the
issue of public participation, and it remains to be researched whether Shen-
zhen’s reform of the social administration will proceed as Liu has advocated.
With the new policy direction of “innovation in social administration,” some
optimistic observers may expect a significant change in the political landscape
of China when a great number of NGOs are incubated and equipped with
legal status and resources in the near future. However, the preliminary as-
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sessment detailed in the above discussion implies that if civil society ideas
and norms are not properly instilled in the incubation process, such innova-
tions will reinforce the actual processes of control over NGOs without shaking
the core of power domination in government-NGO relations.
Conclusion
This paper has detailed how the Chinese state has managed to keep NGO
development under control in the past two decades. By assessing NGOs’
work nature, funding sources, and scope of outreach, different governmental
agencies interact with them on a graduated scale of monitoring and inter-
ference. NGOs are not passive when facing surveillance; they negotiate au-
tonomy with supervisory governmental agencies and sometimes openly
resist harassment by public security or state security agencies. Such reac-
tions and resistance trigger further actions from the state, and thus modify
the overall processes of control and management.
Entering the 2000s, local authorities in China have increasingly recognised
the value of citizens’ self-organised charity, mutual-help, and disaster relief
activities, and the role of NGOs in leading such activities and taking part
in social service delivery. Therefore, along with monitoring and control,
some local governments have started experimenting with friendship poli-
cies to encourage the development of NGOs in social service delivery, com-
munity building, and public participation. This parallel control and
cooperation has two main implications: First, the overall policy environ-
ment for NGO development in China is not one-dimensional but filled with
ironies. For NGOs based in places such as Shanghai, Shenzhen, Chengdu,
and Guangzhou, opportunities for growth and cooperation with the gov-
ernment will be accompanied by monitoring and interference. For others
in most parts of the country, targeted and differentiated control will con-
tinue in spite of new developments in national-level policy documents.
Second, there is no guarantee that the cooperative policy innovations re-
cently put in force will lead to flourishing grassroots NGOs. If implemented
with conventional methods and administrative channels, so-called coop-
erative policies can quickly turn into new means of NGO co-optation. It
will be the state, rather than the sector of NGOs and civil society, that will
benefit most from these policies by inventing a group of quasi-NGOs
whose sole mission is to take in retired bureaucrats, absorb resources, put
up window-dressing, and reiterate official lines. Grassroots NGOs may in
fact be further marginalized by losing out in the new game of competing
for official funding and support.
Should NGOs register with the government and make themselves com-
pletely transparent to the state? Should NGOs bid for government projects
and rely on state funding to sustain their operations? Should NGOs partic-
ipate in the consultation mechanism of the state and refrain from adopting
non-institutional and risky tactics in advocacy? These are questions and
dilemmas that Chinese NGOs will face in the new era of innovation in social
administration.
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